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Abstract
This paper studies the income effect of cash transfers on adult labor outcomes. I use data
of PROGRESA, a large cash transfer program in Mexico that provides money to households
subject to the condition that school aged children go to school. I focus on a subsample of
the eligibles for whom the conditionality is not a binding constraint. This allows me to get
rid of the cross-substitution effect that the conditionality of the transfer may induce. In
practice, it is as if PROGRESA was an unconditional cash transfer for this subpopulation.
Contrary to standard beliefs, I find that the income effect on labor outcomes is not negative.
JEL classification: O12, C93, I32, J22.
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1 Introduction
According to standard job-search theory, providing unconditional cash to people has detri-
mental effects on the probability of finding a job (Chetty, 2008). In the neo-classical theory of
labor supply it is standard to assume that leisure is a normal good (see, among many others
Becker, 1965, Gahvari, 1994, Cahuc et al., 2014). This implies that if agents receive unearned
income, part of the money will be used to buy leisure. In both theories there is a negative
“income effect” on labor outcomes. For developed countries there is empirical evidence that
supports these theoretical predictions (Cesarini et al., 2017, Picchio et al., 2018, Chetty, 2008,
Card et al., 2007, Basten et al., 2014, Schirle, 2015, Gonzalez, 2013). All this reinforces the
belief of economists, policy makers, and the public at large, that unconditional cash transfers
(UCT) generate incentives to work less (for data about beliefs in different countries, see for
instance Banerjee et al., 2017).
Nevertheless, poor people in developing countries face difficulties to meet basic needs. Cash
transfers in those contexts could possibly be used by the recipients to cope with these difficul-
ties. Therefore, they could allow them to be more willing or capable to work. In fact, there
is some recent empirical evidence showing that UCT targeted to poor households in devel-
oping countries do not have detrimental effects on labor outcomes of prime-age adults and
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†EE and IICE, San José, Universidad de Costa Rica, juliana.mesen@ucr.ac.cr
1
could even have positive effects (Ardington et al., 2009, Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016, Salehi-
Isfahani and Mostafavi-Dehzooei, 2018, Franklin, 2018). This evidence questions the standard
properties of canonical job-search and neo-classical models of labor supply (Baird et al., 2018,
Bosch and Manacorda, 2012). And it is useful because it suggests that the background condi-
tions (in particular, the level of income and the degree to which basic needs are covered) are
crucial to understand whether receiving cash unconditionally is or not detrimental to work.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this literature using data of PROGRESA, a ran-
domized control trial (RCT) providing a large (equivalent to 20% of the average wage of the
household head) and long-lasting cash transfer to households in rural Mexico, conditional on
children going to school. This rich data set has already been used to analyze the effect of PRO-
GRESA on adult labor outcomes. And it has been found that it did not affect labor outcomes
negatively (Skoufias et al., 2001, Skoufias and di Maro, 2008, Rubio-Codina, 2010, Alzua et al.,
2013, Banerjee et al., 2017). However, as just said, PROGRESA is a conditional program. Thus,
it is normal to expect the conditionality to play some role in preventing negative effects on la-
bor outcomes of the adult recipients. In fact, a program offering cash subject to the condition
that school age children go to school, induces a “cross-substitution effect” on adults (Rubio-
Codina, 2010, Parker and Todd, 2017). That is, as a response to the program, adults might
work more to substitute for child’s work. Thus, it has been argued, “for adults, the program
has ambiguous effects on leisure and time spent in work activities because the income effect
and the cross-substitution effect of school subsidies work in different directions” (Parker and
Todd, 2017) and because of that reason “the effects of a conditional transfer are likely to differ
compared with an unconditional cash transfer” (ibid).
But then, would PROGRESA still be non detrimental to adult work if the analysis was re-
stricted to a subsample not affected by the conditionality of the program? For such a sub-
sample the “cross-substitution effect” would no longer be present. Thus, PROGRESA would
induce (only) an income effect. This article intends to answer that question by restricting the
dataset of PROGRESA to a subsample (exogenously defined) of adults for whom, I claim, the
conditionality was not binding. Thus, in practice, for this subsample, it is as if PROGRESA
was an unconditional cash transfer.
I focus on the subsample of adults living in households without children between 12-17 years
old. Since school attendance for children below 12 years was almost universal (see Fig.1), the
school conditionality of PROGRESA was not binding for them. That is, it did not induce them
(nor their parents) to change their behavior. Throughout the paper I focus on this subsample
and look at the impact of PROGRESA on three different indicators: (1) labor force participa-
tion in all types of work, (2) labor force participation in day agricultural and nonagricultural
employment (DANAE), a measure that excludes those who are self-employed or who work
without receiving any payment and (3) the number of hours worked per week. I find, using
a difference-in-differences (DiD) empirical strategy, that PROGRESA did not induce this sub-
sample of adults to work less. If anything, the results on DANAE (which is closer to salaried
work) are positive.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: It starts with a literature review. Section 3
briefly describes the main features of PROGRESA, its design, and the data from the available
surveys. Section 4 defines and characterizes the sample with which I work throughout the
paper. Section 5 is the main section, where I present the econometric specification and the
impact of PROGRESA on work, DANAE, and the number of hours worked per week. Section
6 discusses (and tries to rule out) threats to the identification. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
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2 Literature Review
This section starts by presenting empirical evidence about the effect of UCT in developed
countries in contexts in which the recipients do not live in poverty. Further, it discusses addi-
tional mechanisms that could be in place in a context of poverty. Finally, it sums up empirical
evidence of the effects of cash transfers in contexts of scarcity. As stated previously, the aim of
the current work is to contribute to the latter literature.
As highlighted by Schirle (2015) few articles analyze the effect of demogrants (grants awarded
on purely demographic principals, and thus in practice, unconditional) on labor supply, since
many of the existing cash transfer programs have conditions or requirements that affect labor
supply incentives, and therefore are substantially different from unconditional transfers. The
findings of the articles that have successfully analyzed the effect of unconditional transfers in
developed countries, for households that do not live in poverty, tend to find results that are
consistent with the predictions of the standard job-search model or the canonical neo-classical
model of labor supply. That is, they find that people receiving unconditional money tend to
work less, even if the magnitude of the reduction is not necessarily big.
Some papers have looked at this by using data of lottery winners. For instance, Cesarini et al.
(2017) look at Swedish data and Picchio et al. (2018) at Dutch data. Both papers find that
winning the lottery reduces pre-tax earnings by a small magnitude during several years. Yet,
as highlighted by Gonzalez (2013), their results may not be typical responses to increases in
other forms of unearned income. Moreover, these studies might not be representative of the
overall population.
Other studies have looked at the effect of providing cash to people by analyzing data of sev-
erance payments (which are received on top of the unemployment compensations). Chetty
(2008) does it for the US, Card et al. (2007) for Austria and Basten et al. (2014) for Norway.
These studies find that the recipients of the transfers increased their duration in unemploy-
ment. Again, one should keep in mind that the sample of laid off people can be highly selective.
Still other set of articles has looked at the effects of family allowances. In fact, family al-
lowances (which are in place in most developed countries) could act as a sort of unconditional
transfers for families, at least in so far as the transfers do not induce the couple to have (more)
children. That is, in practical terms, the benefit is exogenous to the households given the
presence of children (Kooreman, 2000).
For example, Schirle (2015) looks at the effect of the universal child care benefit (UCCB) intro-
duced in 2006 by the Government of Canada. This program gives benefits of $100 (Canadian
dollars) to families per each kid below the age of 6. With a DiD estimation, and data from
2003-2009, she finds a small but negative effect of the UCCB on both parents labor supply (1.3
percentage points reduction in the extensive margin for married women and 0.4 percentage
points for men). Similarly, Gonzalez (2013), using a regression discontinuity design, looks at
the effect of a one-time cash transfer of 2500€ in Spain that was paid to women having a baby
from July 2007 onward. She finds that women who received the benefit were 4 percentage
points less likely to be working when the baby had 12 months as compared to those who did
not receive the transfer.
Moreover, a recent article studies the effects of a sustained unconditional cash transfer in
Alaska. Since 1982 Alaskan residents (of any age) have been entitled to a yearly cash divi-
dend from the Alaska Permanent fund which in recent years is of around $2000 per person.
Using a synthetic control method (which mixes DiD estimators and elements of matching),
Jones and Marinescu (2018) do not find any significant effect on employment (i.e, on the ex-
tensive margin), but they find an increase of 1.8 percentage points in the share of Alaskans
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who work in par-time jobs.
However, the effect that UCT have on labor outcomes might be substantially different for peo-
ple living in poverty. In such a context one could expect UCT to have positive effects that, over-
all, might outweigh the typical negative effect emphasized by the neo-classical labor supply
model. One reason for this to happen is the one put forward, many years ago, by Leibenstein
(1957): “the amount of work that the representative laborer can be expected to perform de-
pends on his energy level, his health, and his vitality, which in turn depend on his consumption
level and most directly on the nutritive value of his food intake”. This might be particularly
true in a developing rural economy in which work requires a high-energy expenditure, as em-
phasized by Strauss, 1986. Another possible reason is that the money could be used to lessen
liquidity constraints in contexts of incomplete financial markets where the access to credit is
nearly impossible (Alderman and Yemtsov, 2013, Banerjee et al., 2019). Still, another mech-
anism that could be in place for people living in poverty is the one analyzed by Shah et al.
(2012), Mullainathan and Shafir (2013), Mani et al. (2013), Shah et al. (2015), and Schilbach
et al. (2016). According to them, living in a context of scarcity taxes cognitive resources and
this might be detrimental for other aspects of life. Therefore it could be argued that cash trans-
fers, provided to people living in poverty, might lessen the cognitive capacity constraints and
thus have a positive effect on labor outcomes (Mesén Vargas and Van der Linden, 2019).
In fact, there is some recent empirical evidence showing that providing unconditional cash
to agents in poverty is not detrimental to their labor outcomes. Ardington et al. (2009) ana-
lyze the effect of social (means-tested) old-age pension on the labor supply of the prime age
members of the household in South Africa. Their results suggest that the pension plays a
role in lessening both credit and childcare constraints, allowing prime-aged adults to mi-
grate for work. Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) study the impact of an UCT on poor people
in Kenya, using a RCT. The transfer was relatively high (at least twice the average monthly
household consumption in the area) and paid over a short period. They look at the effects
of these transfers on a large number of outcomes. Regarding labor supply, they find that the
transfers did not reduce the probability of having a casual job or a salaried job. Moreover, they
find a positive effect on the number of income-generating activities reported by the house-
hold. Franklin (2018) develops an experiment in Ethiopia where he provides young jobless
people with money (intended to cover transportation costs). He finds that four months after
the start people who received the subsidy were seven percentage points more likely to have
a permanent work. The effect was stronger for relatively poor and cash constrained people.
Salehi-Isfahani and Mostafavi-Dehzooei (2018) use a DiD strategy to analyze the effect of an
UCT that replaces energy subsidies in Iran starting in 2011. The transfers boosted the incomes
of poor households. Since the previous subsidy was regressive, poor households were more
than compensated with the new policy. Transfers amounted to 29% of the median household
income. The authors look at the average effects and at the effects on the bottom 40% of the
income distribution. They find no evidence that cash transfers reduced labor outcomes. To
the contrary, they find positive effects on the labor supply of women. Banerjee et al. (2020)
using an experimental design in Ghana show that poor people who benefited from the GUP
(graduating the ultra poor) program had a higher probability of engaging in an employment
program and were more productive.1 The positive effects of GUP on labor outcomes are not
necessarily driven by a pure income effect since the program has many components. However,
the variation of the unconditional weekly stipend among otherwise identical households allow
the authors to see that those who received a higher cash transfer did not work less, nor had a
1The GUP program had six components: (1) transfer of a productive asset (most households chose a package
that included four goats), (2) skills training for the management of the asset, (3) life skills training and mentorship,
via weekly household visits over two years, (4) a weekly unconditional cash stipend for consumption support,
worth between $6 and $9 PPP depending on family size, during each lean season, (5) access to a savings account at
a local bank and deposit collection, and (6) some basic health services and health education.
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lower productivity than the rest. If anything, they work more and have higher productivity,
however the difference is not significant at conventional levels.
The current article intends to contribute to this literature by exploiting high quality RCT data
and looking at the effects on adults’ labor outcomes of a long-lasting, generous and periodical
transfer provided to thousands of recipients living in poverty.
3 The PROGRESA Experiment
3.1 Brief Description
PROGRESA is a Spanish acronym for “Program of Education, Health and Nutrition”. It started
in 1997 in rural villages in Mexico and changed its name to “Oportunidades” in 2000.2 It
targeted benefits directly to people living in extreme poverty in rural areas of Mexico. As
its name suggests, the program had a multiplicity of objectives. Its aim was to improve the
education, health, and nutrition status of poor families.
Eligibility to the program was determined in two main stages. First, 506 localities were se-
lected using a means index based on census data. Second, within the selected localities, house-
holds were chosen using survey data collected at the household level. In this second step, the
income of the household was considered first to perform a preliminary classification. Then,
a discriminant analysis was performed to incorporate other household characteristics. The
underlying motive was to use a multi-dimensional approach to poverty. Households classi-
fied as “poor” were eligible to receive the benefits. Skoufias et al. (1999) provide a detailed
description of the selection procedure and an evaluation of the methods.3
Cash transfers were given every two months to the female head of the household (typically
the mother of the children in school age, if any). They had two main components. First, the
nutritional grant was received by all beneficiary households conditional on attending medi-
cal check-ups, which were free.4 Second, an educational grant was provided to mothers of
children younger than 18 years old conditional on attending school a minimum of 85% of the
time and on not repeating a grade more than twice.5 The educational grant varies according
to the grade, and for children in secondary school according to gender as well. On top of that,
children received an annual stipend to pay for school materials. Table 1 shows the transfer
structure in real pesos in three different moments. To prevent individual migration into the
household only children who were living in the household at the time of the initial household
survey were eligible for the school transfers (Gertler et al., 2012).
2Since I use data from 1997 to 1999, I refer to the program as PROGRESA, the name it had during that period.
3The original classification scheme classified around 52% of the households of the selected localities as poor.
As Skoufias et al. (2001) and Skoufias and di Maro (2008) I use this original classification. By July 1999 PROGRESA
added new households to the list of beneficiaries since it was felt that some households were unduly excluded. As
a result of this process (called “densification”) 78% of the sample was classified as poor (Skoufias, 2005).
4According to Skoufias (2005), people aged 17 or older are required to have one annual check-up; children
between 5 and 16 two check-ups a year; children between 2 and 4 three check-ups a year; children between 4
months and 24 months eight check-ups. Finally, babies from 0 to 4 months are required to have three check-ups.
5As just said, children were required to maintain an attendance record of 85% or better. Parents were supposed
to receive a form (E1), the form was taken to the teacher who signed for the register of the child, and parents were
supposed to return the signed E1 forms to the PROGRESA officials. Nevertheless, de Brauw and Hoddinott (2011)
report that some households did not receive the E1 form but, according to administrative records, received the
educational grant.
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Table 1: Monthly Amount of Transfers in Real Pesos of Oct 1998
Oct 1998 May 1999 Nov 1999
Education Grant in Primary School per Kid
Third Grade 70 68 69
Fourth Grade 80 81 82
Fifth Grade 100 104 108
Sixth Grade 135 135 142
Education Grant Secondary School per Kid
Girls
Seventh 210 212 216
Eight 235 234 242
Ninth 255 257 263
Boys
Seventh 200 198 207
Eight 210 212 216
Ninth 220 221 229
School Materials per Kid (once a year)
Primary (September) 181
Primary (January) 41
Secondary (September) 170 177
Nutritional Grant (per Household) 100 104 108
Maximum Grant (per Household) 625 626 647
Note: The data to construct this table is taken from Skoufias (2005). Amounts are in real pesos of Oct 1998 per kid.
According to the Bank of Mexico, the Consumer Price Index in October 1998 was 50.4, in May 1999 it was 55.94,
and in November 1999 it was 58.43.
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3.2 Design and Data Collection
Due to budgetary constraints the Government did not enroll all eligible families at the same
time. The full sample used in the evaluation of PROGRESA consists of a panel data of 24000
households in 506 localities in seven states. From the 506 localities 320 were randomly as-
signed to treatment and 186 to control (Behrman and Todd, 2000 analyzed the quality of the
randomization and concluded that treatment and control samples were, all in all, very well
balanced). Eligible households (the ones classified as poor) in treatment localities started to
receive the benefits in July 1998, whereas the eligible households in control localities started to
receive the benefits by December 1999 (Skoufias, 2005). Households in control villages were
not informed that they would receive the benefits until two months before the start. Attana-
sio et al. (2011) explicitly test for anticipation effects and find no evidence. Todd and Wolpin
(2006) report that they find no evidence of anticipation either.
Skoufias (2005), using administrative data, reports that out of the 7837 households classified
as poor in treatment localities, 478 households did not receive any transfers. So the take-up
rate was 93.90%.
Once enrolled, households received the benefits for three years, conditional on meeting the
program requirements stated above. As explained by Gertler et al. (2012), after the three years,
they were “recertified”, that is, their living conditions were reassessed; if they were recertified
as eligible, then they continued receiving the benefits for three more years, until the next
recertification. If not, they were granted the benefits for six more years before being phased
off the program. This means that eligible households in treated villages could expect to receive
the benefits for at least nine years. This was explicitly designed to minimize disincentives to
work, as stated by Schultz (2004), but also to minimize administrative costs and difficulties
related with ascertaining precise income levels in data-poor environments (Banerjee et al.,
2017).
Five household surveys were collected, ENCASEH6 in October 1997 (S1), ENCEL7 in March
1998 (S2), in October 1998 (S3), in May 1999 (S4) and in November 1999 (S5). The first two
were collected at baseline, before the start of PROGRESA, and the last three after the start of
the program. However, the second survey does not include any data related to labor outcomes.
Therefore, like Parker and Skoufias (2000) and Skoufias and di Maro (2008) I do not use that
survey in my analysis. Throughout the paper t refers to time, where t ∈ {1,3,4,5} corresponds
to the timing of each of the relevant surveys. All households, eligible and non-eligible, were
surveyed. For most of the analysis, I will only use data of eligible (poor) households in treated
and non-treated localities; I will only use data of non-eligible people for falsification checks.
Regarding attrition, there is information for just 4.94% of people before the start of the pro-
gram (in S1) but not after. The percentage among the treated is 4.99%, among the non-treated
4.84%, the difference of 0.15% is not significant. Moreover, a joint F-test (for eleven baseline
characteristics)8 shows that attriters are not significantly different depending on whether they
are treated or not. Instead, 30.95% of people cannot be followed throughout the four surveys.
The percentage among the treated is 31.30%, among the non-treated 30.36%, the difference of
0.94% is not significant. Given that the percentage is big and that a joint F-test (for the same
eleven characteristics) rejects equality between those who can be followed through the four
surveys and those who cannot, I proceed like Schultz (2004) does and report all the results
6Encuesta de Caracterı́sticas Socioeconómicas de los Hogares, in English: Survey of socioeconomic character-
istics of the household.
7Encuesta de Evaluación de los Hogares Rurales, in English: Evaluation survey of rural households.
8Sex, whether the agent works, has health insurance, is or not is a household head, marital status, education,
type of work, number of people living in the household, hours worked per week, age, and means index.
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both for the “panel” (agents that can be observed four times) and the “pooled” (all observa-
tions without missing data) samples.9
4 Data
4.1 Sample Selection Criteria
In October 1997, before the start of PROGRESA, 97.6% of children between 7 and 11 years
were already attending school. At the age of 12, the attendance rate sharply decreases. Fig.1
shows the school attendance rate by age before the start of PROGRESA for eligible (poor) chil-
dren living in treatment and control localities. children start attending elementary or primary
school at the age of 5-6 years (most of them at the age of 6), therefore the age of 12 coincides
for most children with the transition from primary school (grades 1 to 6) to junior secondary
school (grades 7 to 9).
Figure 1: School Assistance (%) by age: The graph shows the attendance rate by age, from 7 to 17 years old, for
poor people in treatment and control localities. I use information from ENCASEH 1997 survey and include only
observations without missing school attendance data.
School attendance was almost universal before the start of the program for children below
12 years, which means that in practice the conditionality imposed by PROGRESA was not a
binding constraint for them: most of these children did not change their behavior to meet the
imposed conditions. This has been acknowledged by several authors. For instance, Todd and
Wolpin (2006) write “Because attendance, in the absence of any subsidy, is almost universal
through the elementary school ages, subsidizing attendance at the lower grade levels, as under
the existent program, is essentially an income transfer”. Attanasio et al. (2011) write “... the
grant hardly changes their behaviour in the first place because almost all children go to school
below grade 6, making it an unconditional transfer for that age group”. Attanasio and Lech-
ene (2014) write “In practice, nearly all children go to primary school. (. . . ) for households
with children who have finished primary school, the conditions might be binding”. Finally,
de Brauw and Hoddinott (2011) write “For children continuing primary school (having com-
pleted grades 3, 4 or 5), there is no evidence that conditionality has a significant effect on
school enrollment. We may not find an effect of conditionality at these grade levels in part
because almost all children were already completing these grades.”10
9Attriters, as compared with people that can be followed throughout the four samples, are different in many
characteristics at baseline: they are more often men, more educated, work more, more of them have a DANAE, are
younger, more often do not live together as a couple, fewer of them are household heads, live in bigger households
and are marginally less poor.
10It should be noticed that Schultz (2004) finds a positive impact of PROGRESA in the school attendance rate of
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I claim that in households without children aged between 12 and 17 years, the effect of PRO-
GRESA on adults’ labor outcomes is essentially an income effect. In a vast majority of these
households school-aged children were already going to school before the start of the pro-
gram. That is, the conditionality of PROGRESA did not induce them to modify their behavior.
Therefore adults were not induced themselves to modify their time allocation through a cross-
substitution effect.
In order to define my sample, I create a variable called “seci,t” (sec means secondary school).
Definition: I define seci,t = 0 if agent i lives at time t in a household in which:
1. There has been no kid between 12 and 17 years since Oct 1997 (t = 1) and up to t, and
2. There has been no kid who meets the requisites to be in secondary school since Oct 1997
(t = 1) and up to t.11
If any of the two conditions is not satisfied, then seci,t = 1. The variable “seci,t” is exogenous,
i.e, it is not affected by PROGRESA, because it depends only on the age of the members of the
household and on information collected at baseline (before the start of the program).
Having seci,t = 0 means that the agent lives in a household which never, up to t, received an
educational transfer for a kid aged 12 and above or who is in secondary school. That is, the
conditionality of PROGRESA did not affect the behavior of the person in t nor in previous pe-
riods. One could fear that future conditionality may affect the present decisions of the adults
of the household.12 In order to address this concern, in a robustness check presented in Ap-
pendix D, I restrict the definition of seci,t = 0: I change the age range of the definition so that
it reads: “there has been no kid of ages between 11 and 17 since Oct 1997 (t = 1) and up to t”.
Arguably, future conditionality is less problematic if it is far away in time. As reported in Ap-
pendix D, all the results hold qualitatively when I replicate the estimations for this restricted
subsample.
Fig.2 shows graphically the design of PROGRESA and the groups that I use to identify its
effects. Previous studies analyzed the effect of PROGRESA by comparing the outcomes of
poor people living in treated localities with the ones of poor people living in control localities.
The novelty of my analysis is to focus on a sample that, I claim, is affected by PROGRESA only
through an income effect. That is, I focus on observations for which seci,t = 0 (highlighted in
Fig.2).
children in primary school, however a very small one. The magnitude of this effect is smaller than one percentage
point for his panel sample (children that can be observed throughout all the surveys) and slightly higher than one
percentage point for his pooled sample (sample of all valid child observations).
11To determine whether a kid meets the requisites to be in secondary school, I use information about completed
grades and attendance at baseline, t = 1, and I move it forward assuming no repetition and no dropout.
If I do not observe any member in t in a household, I assume that in t they had a kid of ages 12-17.
12This would be the case, for example, if the father of an 11-year-old kid was planning to drop the kid out
of school next year, but thanks to PROGRESA he changed his mind. Knowing that the kid will attend secondary




320: Treated 186: Control
random random
Non Poor Poor Non Poor Poor
No children between 12-17 years No children between 12-17 years
Figure 2: Design of PROGRESA: Out of the 506 chosen rural localities, 320 were assigned to treatment and 186
to control. Only eligible (poor) households in treated localities received the transfers during the analyzed periods
of 1998-1999. In the core of this paper, I analyze the effect of PROGRESA on the labor outcomes of eligible (poor)
adults for which seci,t = 0, that is for which (1) there have been no kid between 12 and 17 years since Oct 1997
(t = 1) and up to t, and (2) there have been no children who meet the requisites to be in secondary school since Oct
1997 (t = 1) and up to t. Groups with seci,t = 0 are highlighted in the diagram.
In my sample, I exclude all people who were younger than 18 at t = 1. I also exclude all women
older than 68 and men older than 72 (according to the OECD, 2017 these are the effective ages
of retirement in Mexico). I drop all observations with missing relevant data, and call the
remaining ones “valid observations”.
As stated previously, I report the results for two different samples: (1) the pooled sample: com-
posed by all valid observations (37666 observations) with seci,t = 0 and (2) the panel sample:
composed by valid observations of people with seci,t = 0 throughout the four surveys (26164
observations).13
4.2 Outcome Variables
In this subsection I describe the three outcome variables that will be used in the empirical
estimations of Section 5.
Labor force participation (Worki,t) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if agent i reports in t that
she/he worked during the last week and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The four surveys include
a question that asks the person whether, during last week, she/he (1) worked, (2) had a job
but did not work, (3) worked in a family business without receiving any payment, (4) did not
work. If agent i in t answered yes to (1), (2) or (3), then worki,t = 1. If the agent reported that
she/he did not work in the previous question, then a verification question asks whether she/he
was involved in selling products, helping in some business, built products for sale, helped to
work in agricultural activities, or ironed/washed clothes for a pay. If agent i performs any of
these activities in t, then worki,t = 1.
Labor force participation in DANAE (DANAEi,t) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if agent i re-
ports in t to have day agricultural employment or to be a non-agricultural employee, and is
equal to 0 otherwise (i.e, if the person reports that she/he does not work or has another kind
of work). The four surveys include a question about the main occupation at work for those for
13The pooled sample constitutes 36% of the total pooled sample of PROGRESA (which has 104029 observa-
tions), whereas the panel sample amounts for a 32% of the total panel sample of PROGRESA (which has 81436
observations).
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whom worki,t = 1. This question contains eight alternatives: (1) agricultural worker (2) nona-
gricultural employee (3) self-employed (4) business owner (5) worker in a family business
(without receiving any payment) (6) worker without payment (non including family busi-
nesses) (7) member of a cooperative (8) ejidatarios.14 If agent i answered (1) or (2) to this
question in t, then DANAEi,t = 1. DANAEi,t = 0 if agent i reports in t that she/he performs
activities (3) to (8) or if she reports that she/he does not work.15
The number of hours worked per week (Hoursi,t) is a continuous outcome variable. The ques-
tion about the number of hours worked per week was asked differently before and after the
start of PROGRESA. In S1 it was asked to everyone who declared to work. However, in S3 and
S5 it was only asked to those who declared to have a salaried job (in S4 the question was not
asked). No question in S1 asked explicitly whether the person had a salaried job. Because of
this, the empirical strategy that I follow to estimate the effect of PROGRESA on the number of
hours worked per week is different to the one used for the other two outcome variables. The
empirical strategy that I follow is explained in Subsection 5.2.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
In Table 8 of Appendix B, I divide the “total sample” of PROGRESA into observations with
seci,t = 0 (in which I focus throughout the paper) and the remainder, i.e, those with seci,t = 1.
As can be observed, my sample differs in several characteristics from the sample with seci,t = 1.
In general, members of my sample are younger, more educated, live in smaller households,
have fewer children but more children below 6 years old, more often live together as a couple
and according to the means index are marginally less poor.
Table 2 provides information of my samples (those with seci,t = 0) at baseline: a high percent-
age of people live together as a couple, they have on average between three and four years of
education, the average age is 34 (36) years for men and 30 (32) for women in the pooled (panel)
sample. Most men are household heads. Labor characteristics differ substantially among men
and women. While 94% (94%) of men report to work in the pooled (panel) sample, only 12%
(10%) of women do. 71% (72%) of men in the pooled sample have a DANAE, but just 4% (4%)
of women do. On average, the number of adults working per household is 1.2, and the number
of children (people below 12, given that in my sample no one’s age is between 12 and 17) per
household is a bit higher than 2.
As reported in Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix B, which look at data in t = 1 (before the start of
PROGRESA), women who work more often are household heads, less often live in a couple,
tend to have less children below 6 years old, and are older and less educated than women who
do not work. Men who work more often are household heads than men who do not work,
but contrary to women, working men often have more children below 6 years old, more often
live in a couple, and are younger and more educated than men who do not work. The same
patterns are true when one compares women and men who have a DANAE vs. those who do
not (see Tables 11 and 12). These descriptive statistics are compatible with a very traditional
division of labor between genders, and they suggest that women work (outside the household)
mostly when they have to, i.e, when they are household heads.16
14In Mexico an ejido is an area of communal land used for agriculture, on which community members individ-
ually farm designated parcels and collectively maintain communal holdings.
15What I call DANAE is what Skoufias et al. (2001) and Skoufias and di Maro (2008) call “salaried work”. Nev-
ertheless, the term “salaried work” is used in the surveys with a different meaning. Therefore, to avoid confusion,
I prefer to use the term DANAE instead.
16In fact, whereas 44% (38%) of women who are household heads report to work in the pooled (panel) sample,
only 12% (9%) of women who are not household heads do. The patterns for DANAE are similar, 23% (21%) of
women who are household heads report to have a DANAE, instead only 4% (3%) of women who are not household
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Table 2: Individual and Household Characteristics at Baseline (S1)
MEN WOMEN
Individual characteristics Pooled Panel Pooled Panel
Living as a couple 0.85 0.87 0.83 0.85
Years of education 3.59 3.70 3.33 3.50
Age 34.23 35.44 31.85 30.74
Household head 0.84 0.86 0.05 0.05
Work 0.94 0.94 0.12 0.10
DANAE 0.71 0.72 0.04 0.04
N. Obs 18360 12692 19306 13472
Household (hh) characteristics Pooled Panel
# people working per hh 1.21 1.15
# of people in the hh 4.69 4.42
# of children per hh 2.35 2.13
# of hh 5784 2999
Note: These tables report the demographic characteristics of individuals and households in the panel and pooled
sample at baseline (S1). Work is the fraction of people that reported to work. DANAE is an acronym for: day
agricultural or nonagricultural employment. I report the fraction of people (among the total) that reported to have
this type of work.
In Table 13 Appendix B I report data about the amount of money that people in my sample
spend on food, transportation, and clothes. I also report information about the ownership of
animals, which is relevant because animals can increase home consumption. Unfortunately
this information was not collected at baseline. Table 13 shows information of households in
control villages in Survey 3. Since people living in treated and control villages are quite com-
parable (see table 7 in Appendix A) this can give an idea of the expenditures and ownership
of animals of all the households (treated or not) at baseline. According to this information,
the typical household has a weekly expenditure on food of around 125-130 real pesos of Oct
1998.17 Transportation and clothing seem to be minor expenditures.
Moreover, according to a question asked at baseline (S1), more than 98% of the people report
that either they own the house in which they live (which is totally paid), or someone lends it
to them. This suggests that rent is not an important expenditure for them.
For those who work, the average weekly wage at baseline (in real pesos of Oct 1998) is 177
(164) pesos for men and 125 (115) pesos for women in the pooled (panel) sample. On average,
both men and women of the pooled (panel) sample report to work 5.3 (5.2) days a week.
All this information facilitates the comprehension of the magnitude (and relevance) of the
transfer granted by PROGRESA to the households in my sample. For instance, just the nutri-
tional grant amounts to around 18% of the monthly expenditures in food (which is the largest
expenditure of these households). These transfers are very generous, compared with other
CCT in developing countries (see for instance Alzua et al., 2013 and Banerjee et al., 2017).
heads do. Moreover, 89% (87%) of women who report to be household heads do not live in a couple, i.e, apparently
women report to be household heads mostly when they do not have a partner.
17In Appendix F, Table 26 , I provide information of the prices of some consumption goods in treated and
control localities.
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5 Econometric Specification and Results
This section presents the econometric specification and the impact of PROGRESA on: (1) labor
force participation in all kinds of work, (2) labor force participation in DANAE and (3) the
number of hours worked per week.
Since I do not know who actually received the transfers and who did not, in all the cases I re-
port estimates of the “intention to treat” effect (Angrist et al., 1996). Nevertheless, given that
the take-up of PROGRESA among eligible people in treated villages is very high (93.9% of
eligible households in treated villages received the transfers), and given that no one in control
villages was entitled to receive the transfers, the estimates should be close to the “treatment ef-
fect on the treated”. For the first part of the section, treatment is defined as a dummy variable:
a person is treated if she/he lives in a treated locality and not treated otherwise.
As I mentioned before, it is women who are entitled to receive the transfers of PROGRESA.
This means that my estimates of the effect of PROGRESA on the labor outcomes of men im-
plicitly assume that there is income pooling in the household. This is a caveat (see for instance
Duflo, 2003 and Attanasio and Lechene, 2014). But, to the best of my knowledge, this has
always been assumed when estimating the effect of PROGRESA on labor outcomes (see for
instance: Skoufias et al., 2001, Skoufias and di Maro, 2008, Rubio-Codina, 2010, Alzua et al.,
2013, Banerjee et al., 2017).
In the coming subsections I present the econometric specification and results for the three
indicators mentioned before. First I analyze the effect of PROGRESA on the labor force partic-
ipation and then focus on the impact of PROGRESA on the number of hours worked per week.
I split the analysis because, given the design of the surveys, the empirical strategy that I follow
is different.
5.1 Labor Force Participation
5.1.1 Specification
To identify the effect of PROGRESA on the labor force participation of adults I use a DiD
specification, which allows me to exploit the panel structure of the data. This specification
eliminates all pre-program differences between treatment and control groups under the as-
sumption that unobserved heterogeneity between these two groups is fixed over time.
The Baseline specification is the following:





Yi,t is the dummy outcome variable for individual i in time t ∈ 1,3,4,5. I do the estimation for
(1) Worki,t and (2) DANAEi,t (see Subsection 4.2 for the definition of the outcome variables).
Ti is the treatment, in this case a dummy variable. It is equal to 1 if person i lives in a treated
locality and it is equal to 0 otherwise.
Expostt is also a dummy variable. It is equal to 1 if the time of the survey is 3, 4 or 5 (that is,
after the start of the program) and it is equal to 0 if the time of the survey is 1 (before the start
of the program).
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S3,S4,S5 are time dummies, equal to 1 if the time of the survey is, respectively, 3, 4 or 5, and
zero otherwise.
Finally, Xij is a set of j characteristics for individual i measured at t = 1. These are control
variables that are included to increase precision of the estimates (Duflo et al., 2007). I include
the following controls: age, age squared, locality of residence (among the 506 possible ones),
whether the person lives together as a couple, number of people in the household, whether the
person is the household head, and number of years of education.18
The coefficient of interest is βT , it provides the difference in the dependent variable across
the treated and control individuals relative to their baseline values, conditional on the control
variables.
I run the regression using OLS (about the good performance of OLS with limited dependent
variables, see for instance Angrist and Pischke, 2009, Ch. 3). Nevertheless, qualitative re-
sults do not change if I run a Probit regression instead (results are available upon request).
Because of the experimental design, localities rather than individuals, were assigned to treat-
ment. Therefore I cluster the errors at the locality level (Abadie et al., 2017, Bertrand et al.,
2004). Clustering allows any kind of autocorrelation of the errors within the cluster, in this
case the localities (Cameron and Miller, 2015). I estimate this regression separately for men
and women.
I also estimate a specification with Dynamic Effects. This allows to estimate the effect of
PROGRESA, separately, at each survey time: S3, S4, S5. To do that I estimate:




where everything is the same as before, except for the fact that now I disentangle the effect of
the treatment for each survey time. The coefficients of interest are: βT 3, βT 4 and βT 5. Each of
these coefficients provide the effect of PROGRESA on Yi,t from t = 1 up to t ∈ 3,4,5, respec-
tively.
My final specification explores the presence of Heterogeneous Effects. I want to know whether
the effect of PROGRESA on people who were intended to receive only the nutritional grant
(fully unconditional, except for the annual medical check-ups) is different from the effect of
PROGRESA on the rest of the people, i.e, those who were intended to receive the nutritional
grant but also, in some t, the educational grant coming from a kid in primary school.
In order to do this, I created a variable called “GAi”.
Definition: I define GAi=0 for an agent i if seci,t = 0 for all t in which i appears, and moreover
the person lives in a household in which:
(1) There has been no kid between 8 and 11 years through all the surveys in which the house-
hold appears, and
(2) There has been no kid who meets the requisites to be in grades 3 to 6 of primary school
through all the surveys in which the household appears.19
GAi=1 for the rest of the sample, i.e, for those who live in a household which in some t was
intended to receive an educational transfer for a kid in primary school. I estimate:
18I include the same controls as Banerjee et al. (2017) plus the locality of residence and whether the person is
the household head.
19Again, to determine whether a kid meets the requisites to be in grades 3 to 6, I use information about com-
pleted grades and attendance at baseline, t = 1, and I move it forward assuming no repetition and no drop out.
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Yi,t = α + β1GAi + β2Ti + β3Ti ∗GAi + β4GAi ∗Expostt + βT Ti ∗Expostt + βTGTi ∗GAi ∗Expostt




where GAi is the dummy variable defined above and the rest is the same as before. The coeffi-
cients of interest are βT for the group with GAi = 0 and βT + βTG for the group with GAi = 1.
For all the estimations (1), (2), and (3) of the panel sample, I also report the results using
individual fixed effects (IFE). IFE are useful if one fears that individual unobserved factors are
correlated in some way with the treatment (Wooldridge, 2016, Ch 13). It does not seem to be
the case here, since treatment only depends on the locality of residence, and localities were
randomly assigned into treatment. Nevertheless, I report the results using IFE as a robustness
check.
Appendix E reports the results of the estimations (1), (2), and (3) for the whole sample (i.e
whatever value of seci,t and not only for observations with seci,t = 0). These results are consis-
tent with what has been found in previous studies: the effect of PROGRESA on labor outcomes
is in general small and not significantly different from zero.
5.1.2 Results
Table 3 reports the results of regressions (1) baseline, (2) dynamic effects, and (3) heteroge-
neous effects, where the dependent variable is “work”. The first column of 3 reports the results
for the pooled sample of men, the second for the panel sample of men, and the third for the
panel also, but with individual fixed effects. Columns four to six report the same results for
women. Recall from the definition of work (Section 4.2) that people who work (work=1) do not
necessarily receive an income in exchange. Table 4 replicates Table 3 for the outcome DANAE.
DANAE=1 implies that the person works in a day agricultural or nonagricultural work and
gets paid in exchange. Thus, DANAE is closer to the idea of remunerated employment. In the
coming paragraphs I comment first the results for men, and then for women.
For men, when work is the outcome variable, coefficients are overall negative, but none of them
is significant at conventional levels. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficients is relatively
small. In the baseline estimation, for instance, no effect is bigger than 1.4 percentage points in
absolute value. Instead, when DANAE is the outcome variable, coefficients are mostly positive.
PROGRESA seems to have a positive effect of 3.9 percentage points (pooled sample) when one
looks at the three ex-post surveys altogether. The effect in Oct 98 (t = 3) was large, of 5.7
percentage points, and significant at 10%.
Appendix C explores, using a specification similar to (3), whether the effects are heterogeneous
according to some relevant characteristics at baseline. Tables 14-15 look at whether the effect
of PROGRESA is different among the poorest as compared to those who are less poor (I used
the means index at t = 1 to split the sample in two). For men, we find that the differences
between the two groups are small and non significantly different from zero. Tables 16-17, in
turn, look at whether the effect of PROGRESA differs for those who were household heads at
baseline as compared to those who were not. The differences are not statistically different,
however, they are sizeable. For instance, for both groups PROGRESA has a negative effect on
work, but the effect is more negative among those who are not household heads. Instead, the
effect on DANAE even if positive for both groups, is mostly driven by men who are household
heads.
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Overall, one could say that for men PROGRESA had negative but small effects on work and
positive, bigger, effects on DANAE, even if these effects are not always significant. This sug-
gests that PROGRESA made some men move from less formal activities (comprised in “work”)
into some other activities for which they received a fixed payment, that is, DANAE. Moreover,
the positive effect on DANAE is much stronger among men who were household heads at base-
line. With time, the positive effects on DANAE remain positive and larger in absolute value
than the negative effects on work, however, they seem to lose strength. If anything, one could
say that PROGRESA had a positive effect on DANAE for men.
As highlighted by Banerjee et al. (2017), the expected effect of cash transfers on women in a
context like the present one is not obvious at all. The additional income might allow a woman
who previously had a job to stay home with the children if she prefers, but at the same time,
additional income might allow her to afford childcare and actually, to be able to work.
In Table 3 we observe a considerable reduction (even if not significantly different from zero)
of work performed by women when the expost surveys are considered altogether. However, it
seems that this reduction was mostly present at the beginning of the program (at t = 3), and
did not last much, since by November 1999 (t = 5) the negative effect of PROGRESA on work
for women decreased substantially. The effects of PROGRESA on DANAE, for women, are very
small in absolute terms and statistically insignificant.
Recall that only a minority of women (no bigger than 12% at baseline for any of the samples)
performed any kind of work outside the household at baseline, and that the biggest share of
those who did, were household heads. In fact, looking at Tables 16-17 in Appendix C one
can see that the reduction of work for women seems to be mostly driven by women who were
household heads. Even if the difference in the effect on women who were household heads as
compared with those who were not is not statistically significant, the negative effect for house-
hold heads is substantial and more negative than the one for those who were not household
heads. The effects on DANAE, instead, are almost equal to zero in absolute terms for both
subgroups.
Tables 14-15 show that the effect on work is significantly different (at 10%) among poorer and
less poor women. The negative effect is almost totally driven by women who were less poor,
since the effect on the poorest women is virtually equal to zero in absolute terms. Instead, the
level of poverty does not significantly change the effect of PROGRESA on DANAE for women,
which again seems to be close to zero in absolute terms both for the poorer and for the less
poor women.
Overall, for women we observe a reduction of work which is considerable in size, even if
not statistically different from zero. This negative effect is not accompanied by an increase
in their participation in paid employment, as it was the case for men (in fact, the effect of
PROGRESA on DANAE seems to be pretty close to zero in absolute terms for women in every
considered specification). Possibly cultural norms might help explain that women did not
perform more paid employment outside the household, since, for instance, as reported by
Adato et al. (2000) before the start of PROGRESA more than 90% of women reported that
they needed their husband’s permission to visit relatives or neighbors. Strong social norms
together with the fact that the activities comprised in “work” (mostly self-employment and
unpaid family work) are probably badly remunerated (if remunerated at all), might help to
explain that women, at the beginning, were more likely to stop performing these activities
and possibly to substitute them by more activities at home. However, as remarked before, the
negative effect on work for women was almost equal to zero by the time of the last survey.
Therefore, one could conclude that PROGRESA had a (non-significant) negative but non long-
lasting effect on women’s work that was mostly driven by those who were less poor (among the
poor) and household heads, and a negligible (absolute) effect on paid employment (DANAE).
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Tables 3-4 also report the effect of PROGRESA for two different groups of people, those who
never received an educational grant coming from a kid in primary school (those with GAi = 0)
and those who, in some moment, received an educational grant coming from a kid in primary
school (those with GAi = 1). As explained before, since those with GAi = 0 only received the
nutritional transfer, which is fully unconditional (except for the free annual medical check-
ups), the effect of PROGRESA on this subsample is a pure income effect by definition. The
effects for this group, however, are similar (and the difference, i.e, βTG, non-statistically dif-
ferent) from the effects that we observe for those with GAi = 1 for which, I have claimed
throughout the paper, the transfers (even if they contain an educational component) are also,
in practice, unconditional.
Let me just recall at this stage that, as reported in Appendix D, these results are robust to a
slight change in the definition of “seci,t” (see Section 4.1) according to which the sample is
(further) restricted to adults living in households in which never, up to t, lived children aged
11 and above. In fact, the results are qualitatively the same and very similar in magnitude.
Finally, it is worth to highlight that despite the existing differences between my sample (i.e,
those with seci,t = 0) and the rest of the sample of PROGRESA (i.e, those with seci,t = 1), the
effects of the program when one considers only those with seci,t = 0 are quite similar to the
effects observed when the whole sample of PROGRESA is analyzed.20 In the latter case, for
men one observes negative (but not significant) effects on work (a bit smaller in absolute value
when compared to the ones of my sample), and positive and significant effects on DANAE,
which lose strength through time but remain positive. For women one observes negative (but
not significant) effects on work and an effect on DANAE very close to zero in absolute terms.
All this suggests that the effects of PROGRESA on adult labor outcomes are robust, and in
particular that the conditionality of the program (which was a binding constraint for adults in
households with children in secondary school) did not induce important differences on these
indicators.
20As stated before, the differences between the two groups could be seen in Table 8 in Appendix B and the
results of the estimations for the whole sample are reported in Appendix E.
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Table 3: Impact of PROGRESA on the Probability of Working
MEN WOMEN
Pooled Panel Panel (FE) Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
Baseline
βT -0.014 -0.006 -0.006 -0.019 -0.016 -0.016
(.009) (.011 ) (.011) (.018) (.017) (.017)
Dynamic Effects
βT 3 (in t = 3) -0.009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.020 -0.023 -0.023
(.011) (.022) (.013) (.020) (.021) (.021)
βT 4 (in t = 4) -0.019 -0.013 -0.013 -0.027 -0.021 -0.021
(.011) (.013) (.013) (.019) (.018) (.018)
βT 5 (in t = 5) -0.015 -0.004 -0.004 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005
( .009) (.012) (.013) (.022) (.021) (.021)
Heterogeneous Effects
βT (for GAi=0) -0.020 -0.013 -0.014 -0.025 -0.021 -0.021
(.016) (.017) (.017) (.020) (.018) (.018)
βT + βTG (for GAi=1) -0.013 0.001 0.002 -0.017 -0.012 -0.012
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.021) (.022) (.022)
Pre-Program Level 0.937 0.942 0.942 0.118 0.104 0.104
N. Obs 18360 12692 12692 19306 13472 13472
Note: This table reports the effect of PROGRESA on the probability of working. Treated individuals are those who
live in treated localities. In the first column I report the results of an OLS regression for a sample that includes all
valid observations of men for which seci,t = 0. In the second column the results of an OLS regression for all valid
observations of men who have seci,t = 0 in all the surveys. In the third one, I use the same sample as before but
I include individual fixed effects. In columns four to six I report the results of the same estimations for women.
Errors are clustered at the locality level and reported in parenthesis. See the main text for the definition of GAi .
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
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Table 4: Impact of PROGRESA on the probability of having a DANAE
MEN WOMEN
Pooled Panel Panel (FE) Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
Baseline
βT 0.039* 0.030 0.031 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(.022) (.025) (.025) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Dynamic Effects
βT 3 (in t = 3) 0.057* 0.033 0.034 0.000 -0.005 -0.006
(.029) (.030) (.030) (.008) (.009) (.009)
βT 4 (in t = 4) 0.027 0.028 0.029 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(.025) (.028) (.028) (.009) (.010) (.010)
βT 5 (in t = 5) 0.025 0.030 0.030 0.004 0.002 0.003
(.028) (.032) (.032) (.009) (.008) (.008)
Heterogeneous Effects
βT (for GAi=0) 0.044 0.028 0.029 0.004 0.004 0.004
(.028) (.032) (.032) (.010) (.010) (.010)
βT + βTG (for GAi=1) 0.035 0.033 0.033 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005
(.025) (.029) (.029) (.009) (.010) (.010)
Pre-Program Level 0.714 0.723 0.723 0.045 0.038 0.038
N. Obs 18323 12671 12671 19231 13410 13411
Note: This table replicates Table 3, with day agricultural or nonagricultural employment (DANAE) as dependent
variable. See Table 3 for details.
5.2 Hours Worked per Week
Previous subsections looked at the effect of PROGRESA on the extensive margin (whether
people work or not). This one, instead, looks at its effect on the intensive margin (the number
of hours worked).
Skoufias et al. (2001) and Skoufias and di Maro (2008) do not include an estimation of the
effect of PROGRESA on the number of hours worked. Alzua et al. (2013) and Banerjee et al.
(2017) do, using a DiD empirical strategy, but to the best of my knowledge, they do not ac-
knowledge that the question was asked to a different set of people before and after the start of
PROGRESA.21
To avoid this problem one could rely on randomization for the identification by using only
the ex-post surveys. One could use S3 and S5 data, keep all the observations (assigning zero
hours worked to those who do not have a salaried job) and estimate the effect of PROGRESA
on the number of hours worked in a “salaried” job. The problem of doing so is that the results
would be difficult to interpret, since the estimation would mix the effect of PROGRESA on the
intensive and extensive margins (Rothstein and von Watcher, 2017). To avoid this problem,
and to be able to focus on the intensive margin, I proceed in a different way.
I look only at men who declared to have a DANAE in S1 and still declare to have a DANAE in
21As explained in Subsection 4.2, in S1 the question was asked to everyone who declared to work, whereas in
S3 and S5 only to those who declared to have a salaried job. And no question in S1 explicitly asked whether the
person had a salaried job.
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S3 and S5, respectively.22 Among these people, who were employed and remained employed,
the effect of PROGRESA on the number of hours worked, if any, is on the intensive margin.
Two problems arise: First, in S3 and S5 I do not have data of the number of hours worked for
all the people who declared to have a DANAE (since the question was only asked to those who
declared to have a “salaried” job). I have data for 92.43% of them (92.44% of the control and
92.43% of the treated; the difference is not statistically significant), therefore I look at those.
Second, one could fear that this is a selected sample, i.e. that the probability of being part of
the sample is affected by PROGRESA (Lee, 2009). Because of this, I first look at whether the
probability of having a DANAE in S3 (respectively, S5) for those who had a DANAE in S1 is
different for treated and control observations. To do that, I run a regressions like (1) and (2)
but only among men who had a DANAE in S1. As reported in Table 5, I find that PROGRESA
did not have any significant effect at any conventional level on this group. This suggests that
the sample is not selected.
Table 5: Effect of PROGRESA on DANAE for those with a DANAE at Baseline
Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
Baseline -0.010 -0.021 -0.021
βT (.015) (.014) (.014)
Dynamic Effects
βT 3 (in t = 3) 0.003 -0.019 -0.018
(.022) (.022) (.022)
βT 5 (in t = 5) -0.029 -0.024 -0.024
(.017) (.018) (.018)
N. Obs 10266 6864 6864
Note: This table reports the effect of PROGRESA on the probability of having a day agricultural or a nonagri-
cultural employment (DANAE) in S3/S5 for those who had a DANAE in S1 (no data about the number of hours
worked is reported in S4). Treated individuals are those who live in treated localities. In the first column I report
the results of an OLS regression for a sample that includes all valid observations of men for which seci,t = 0 and
who had a DANAE in S1. The second column shows the results of an OLS regression for all valid observations
of men who have seci,t = 0 in all the surveys and who had a DANAE in S1. In the third column I use the same
sample as before, but I include individual fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the locality level and reported in
parenthesis. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Given this, I use the following DiD specification for the sample of men having a DANAE in S1
and S3 or in S1 and S5, respectively:




where X ∈ {3,5}. I run the regressions separately for S3 and S5. Hoursi,t is the number of
hours worked per week. Ti and control variables are the same as before.
βTX is the coefficient of interest. It provides the effect of PROGRESA on the number of hours
22I focus, for this part of the analysis, on men because as stated before, the percentage of women who had a
DANAE at baseline is very small, smaller than 5%.
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worked per week for men who report to have a DANAE in S1 and also in S3 (or S5, respec-
tively).
As reported in Table 6, PROGRESA did not have any significant effect on the intensive mar-
gin for this sample. Coefficients for t = 3 are positive, and coefficients in t = 5 are negative.
However they are small, all of them smaller than one hour per week in absolute value. These
effects are compatible with a zero income effect on the intensive margin.
Table 6: Effect of PROGRESA on the Number of Hours Worked per Week
Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
βT 3 (in t = 3) 0.376 0.680 0.689
(.952) (1.091) (1.08)
Pre-Program Level 43.43 43.17 43.17
N. Obs 5535 3454 3454
βT 5 (in t = 5) -0.543 -0.465 -0.449
(.968) (1.07) (1.06)
Pre-Program Level 43.69 43.49 43.49
N. Obs 4967 3838 3838
Note: This table reports the effect of PROGRESA on the number of hours worked per week for men who had a day
agricultural or nonagricultural employment (DANAE) in S1 and who also had it in S3/S5, respectively. Treated
individuals are those who live in treated localities. In the first column I report the results of an OLS regression for
a sample that includes all valid observations of men for which seci,t = 0 and who had a DANAE in S1 and also have
it in S3/S5, respectively. In the second column the results of an OLS regression for all valid observations of men
who have seci,t = 0 in all the surveys and who had a DANAE in S1 and who also have it in S3/S5, respectively. In
the third column I use the same sample as before but I include individual fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the
locality level and reported in parenthesis. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10%
level.
6 Falsification Tests
In this section I discuss some threats for identification and also perform falsification tests to
try to rule out these threats; all the tables of this section are reported in Appendix F.
One may fear that the absence of negative effects on labor outcomes is driven by general equi-
librium effects unleashed by PROGRESA. This might be the case since the proportion of house-
holds who received the transfers in treated villages is substantial.23 A common concern is that
PROGRESA caused prices (of goods and land) in treated localities to increase or wages to de-
crease and therefore people maintained their previous labor choices (even in the presence of
the subsidy) to cope with this.
The surveys at the locality level (S3, S4 and S5) collected information about prices. I report
an extract of this information in Table 26. Out of fifteen consumption goods just one good has
a price that is significantly different (although the difference is very small) among treated and
control localities. The rest of the prices are very similar.
23As mentioned before, the original classification scheme classified around 52% of the households of the se-
lected localities as poor, and the take-up rate among eligibles in treated localities was of 93.90% (Skoufias, 2005).
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I have no information about the price of rents in the different localities. Nevertheless, as
reported in Table 27, more than 98% of people report that they do not pay any rent: either
because they own their house, or because it is lent to them by someone. Therefore this does
not seem to be a source of concern.
The surveys at the locality level also contain information about average wages. I report this
information in Table 28. According to this information, wages are not significantly different
in treated and control localities. Using my data I further verify this by estimating the effect
on wages using the same methodology to the one used to estimate the effect of PROGRESA on
the number of hours worked per week. I report these results in Table 29. I find no significant
effect at 5% level, and the point estimates are small but positive.
Finally, I try to rule out the presence of general equilibrium effects by testing whether other
time varying factors in the locality characteristics affected labor outcomes. I do this by us-
ing the data on non-eligibles:24 people living in control and treated localities who were not
classified as “poor”, and therefore did not receive any transfer. In Appendix F I replicate the
baseline estimations for non-eligibles with seci,t = 0 and I find no significant effects at 5%
level; this is consistent with previous findings of Skoufias and di Maro (2008) and Alzua et al.
(2013). I obtain the same if I focus on the poorest half of the non-eligibles with seci,t = 0.
7 Conclusion
In the context of PROGRESA, adults living in households without children in secondary school
should only be affected by the income effect (and not by the cross-substitution effect induced
by the conditionality) of the cash transfer. This implies that for this exogenously selected
subsample, PROGRESA acts essentially as an UCT. I find that, contrary to the predictions
of the neo-classical theory of labor supply, these adults did not use the additional money to
“buy leisure”. To the contrary, if anything, PROGRESA had a positive effect on remunerated
employment.
The studies previously cited in the literature review could shed some light on the reasons
of why this is the case. For example, as explained by Alderman and Yemtsov (2013), the
cash transfer might have been used to lessen liquidity constraints. In fact, less than 1% of
the analyzed sample reported to have savings, and after the start of the program only 4% of
households living in control localities reported to have a loan, the majority coming from an
informal source (friends or family). Thus, the lack of savings and the limited possibilities to
get indebted, together with the extreme poverty, may explain that people prefer to use the
money provided by PROGRESA to face urgent expenditures or to make investments instead
of working less. This is consistent with the findings of Gertler et al. (2012) who show that
PROGRESA beneficiaries invested part of the transfers in productive assets, which allowed
them to increase agricultural income by almost 10% after 18 months. Further, Hoddinott
and Skoufias (2004) show that eligible households in treated localities increased their caloric
acquisition by 6.4%, and that this higher intake is mostly driven by calories coming from
vegetables and animal products. The better food intake can translate in better health outcomes
(Gertler, 2000) which in turn may increase productivity and availability to work (Leibenstein,
1957).
It could be further argued that the absence of negative effect on labor outcomes of adults
is explained by the fact that even if the transfers are generous, they are not high enough to
24I stick to the original criteria of eligibility. I do not consider the “densified” as non-eligible (nor as eligible).
Like Angelucci and de Giorgi (2009), I drop these observations.
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induce exits from employment.25 This could be true, however, what is also true is that these
substantial transfers do have an immediate effect on the reduction of extreme poverty which is
valuable by itself (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009), and as emphasized by Alderman and Yemtsov
(2013) allow to better distribute among all the gains of growth.
I agree with Fiszbein and Schady, 2009 on the fact that the conditionality of CCT programs
(which, after PROGRESA, became widely extended in developing countries) might play an
important role.26 However, as the current work pretends to contribute to show, this does not
imply that it is necessarily the conditionality of the programs that prevents long-term depen-
dency or an irresponsible attitude of the recipients. In fact, people living in poverty have many
good reasons to use the money (even if unconditionally provided) in a responsible way, con-
sistent with their present and future well-being. Thus, the role that the conditionality of this
kind of programs play in preventing negative effects on adult labor outcomes, in my opinion,
should not be overemphasized. Because doing so shadows other important mechanisms that
might be at play and that should be explored to better understand the needs and requirements
of people living in poverty.
25Even if the transfer is not high enough to persuade the primary earner (household head) of the household
to leave his/her remunerated employment, one could have possibly expected other members of the household to
withdraw from DANAE. However recall that, as shown in Table 15 in Appendix C, this was not the case.
26Two reasons are: First, it might facilitate the implementation of these kind of programs, since voters are
more willing to “help” the “deserving” poor. Second, it could be useful to emphasize and strength the importance





The following table presents a balance check for the observations that I use throughout the paper, i.e those with seci,t = 0. The first four sets of
columns are for observations in the “pooled sample” (present in S1,S3, S4 and S5 respectively) and the last set of columns for the “panel sample”
(those who are present throughout the four surveys).
Table 7: Balance Check of Characteristics at t = 1
S1 S3 S4 S5 Panel
Variables at Baseline C T ND PV C T ND PV C T ND PV C T ND PV C T ND PV
Sex (men) 0.49 0.49 -0.01 0.32 0.49 0.49 -0.01 0.43 0.48 0.49 -0.01 0.34 0.48 0.49 -0.01 0.18 0.48 0.49 -0.01 0.34
Work 0.51 0.53 -0.06 0.02** 0.51 0.53 -0.04 0.09* 0.50 0.52 -0.04 0.09* 0.50 0.52 -0.04 0.10 0.50 0.52 -0.04 0.08*
Health insurance 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.23 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.33 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.28
Household (hh) head 0.43 0.43 0.00 0.93 0.44 0.43 0.01 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.00 0.74 0.44 0.43 0.01 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.01 0.33
Living in a couple 0.84 0.83 0.03 0.40 0.85 0.84 0.04 0.23 0.86 0.85 0.05 0.20 0.86 0.85 0.04 0.31 0.88 0.86 0.06 0.11
DANAE=1 0.39 0.36 0.05 0.11 0.39 0.36 0.06 0.06* 0.39 0.36 0.05 0.10 0.39 0.36 0.05 0.14 0.39 0.36 0.05 0.14
Years of education 3.33 3.40 -0.02 0.69 3.41 3.49 -0.03 0.64 3.49 3.52 -0.01 0.87 3.51 3.61 -0.04 0.55 3.52 3.65 -0.04 0.46
# of people in the hh 4.99 5.02 -0.02 0.68 5.26 5.29 -0.01 0.72 5.30 5.28 0.01 0.79 4.64 4.70 -0.04 0.41 4.63 4.67 -0.02 0.59
Hours worked p/week 21.74 22.65 -0.04 0.19 21.65 22.20 -0.02 0.46 21.35 21.74 -0.02 0.57 21.55 21.91 -0.02 0.63 21.41 21.77 -0.02 0.62
Age 33.52 33.64 -0.01 0.75 32.88 33.03 -0.01 0.72 32.61 32.83 -0.02 0.62 32.25 32.34 -0.01 0.84 32.06 32.13 -0.01 0.88
Means Index 648.52 646.59 0.03 0.68 649.91 648.85 0.01 0.83 652.06 650.14 0.03 0.70 654.02 653.59 0.01 0.84 653.31 652.89 0.01 0.93
Joint F-test 0.184 0.107 0.169 0.112 0.119





(Imbens and Rubin, 2015 pg. 310), PV: P-Value. All the variables are at baseline. DANAE: day agricultural or nonagricultural employment. The table is organized
in five sets of columns. The first set provides the balance check for all the observations (12773) present in S1. The second one, the balance check for all the observations
(9978) present in S3, etc. The last set presents the balance check for observations of people who were present through all the four surveys (and therefore belong to the panel
sample). Number of observations: S1:12 773, S3: 9978, S4: 8003, S5: 6912, Panel: 6541.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
B Descriptive Statistics
This Appendix presents several tables. The first table, Table 8, shows the characteristics of
agents with seci,t = 0 vs. those with seci,t = 1 (see Section 4 for the definition of seci,t). Table 9,
shows the characteristics for men who worked at baseline vs. those who did not and Table 11
shows the characteristics of men who had a DANAE at baseline vs. those who did not. Respec-
tively, Tables 10 and 12 show the same information for women. Finally, Table 13 summarizes
the expenditures of the households that belong to my samples (agents with seci,t = 0). It also
includes the percentage of households who own domestic animals.
Table 8: Characteristics of observations with “seci,t = 0” vs. “seci,t = 1”
Characteristics at t = 1 seci,t=0 seci,t=1 ND P-value
Sex (men) 0.49 0.50 -0.02 0.001***
Work 0.52 0.54 -0.03 0.003***
Health insurance at work 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.422
Household head 0.43 0.38 0.11 0.000***
Living in a couple 0.83 0.74 0.21 0.000***
DANAE=1 0.37 0.36 0.03 0.003***
Years of education 3.37 2.94 0.15 0.000***
Num. of people in the hh 5.01 7.66 -1.21 0.000***
Num of children (below 18) 2.40 4.51 -1.20 0.000***
Num of small children (below 6) 1.46 1.11 0.32 0.000***
Hours worked per week 22.32 23.33 -0.04 0.000***
Age 33.59 37.17 -0.28 0.000***
Means Index 647.30 635.26 0.15 0.000***
N. Obs 12773 16714
Note: This table splits the observations in S1 (at baseline) among those with seci,t = 0 and those with seci,t = 1, and






*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Table 9: Characteristics of Men who Work and who did not Work at Baseline
Pooled Panel
work=1 work=0 ND P-value work=1 work=0 ND P-value
# of children under 6 years 1.46 0.98 -0.46 0.000*** 1.52 0.79 -0.74 0.000***
Living in a couple 0.86 0.57 -0.70 0.000*** 0.89 0.60 -0.70 0.000***
# of people in the hh 4.94 4.99 0.02 0.697 4.60 4.48 -0.08 0.375
Hh head 0.84 0.54 -0.70 0.000*** 0.87 0.60 -0.64 0.000***
Education 3.55 2.99 -0.18 0.002*** 3.74 3.16 -0.19 0.014**
Age 34.26 41.18 0.45 0.000*** 33.18 39.55 0.44 0.000***
N. Observations 5830 407 2990 183
Note: This table splits the observations of men in S1 (at baseline) among those who work and those who did not





*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 10: Characteristics of Women who Work and who did not Work at Baseline
Pooled Panel
work=1 work=0 ND P-value work=1 work=0 ND P-value
# of children under 6 years 1.35 1.50 0.14 0.001*** 1.34 1.55 0.20 0.000***
Living in a couple 0.62 0.85 0.54 0.000*** 0.68 0.87 0.48 0.000***
# of people in the hh 5.03 5.08 0.03 0.626 4.47 4.74 0.17 0.013**
Hh head 0.18 0.03 -0.47 0.000*** 0.17 0.03 -0.46 0.000***
Education 2.68 3.33 0.23 0.000*** 2.81 3.59 0.26 0.000***
Age 34.32 32.25 -0.15 0.000*** 33.26 30.44 -0.22 0.001***
N. Observations 863 5673 353 3015
Note: This table splits the observations of women in S1 (at baseline) among those who work and those who did not





*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Table 11: Characteristics of Men with DANAE=1 vs. DANAE=0 at Baseline
Pooled Panel
DANAE=1 DANAE=0 ND P-value DANAE=1 DANAE=0 ND P-value
# of children under 6 years 1.46 1.35 -0.11 0.002*** 1.52 1.37 -0.15 0.004***
Living in a couple 0.87 0.78 -0.25 0.000*** 0.84 0.82 -0.04 0.000***
# of people in the hh 4.87 5.13 0.13 0.000*** 4.56 4.70 0.09 0.101
Hh head 0.86 0.75 -0.27 0.000*** 0.88 0.80 -0.23 0.000***
Education 3.65 3.17 -0.17 0.000*** 3.83 3.38 -0.16 0.002***
Age 33.58 37.47 0.29 0.000*** 32.61 36.01 0.27 0.000***
N. Observations 4415 1812 2291 878
Note: This table splits the observations of men in S1 (at baseline) among those who had a DANAE and those who
did not have a DANAE, and reports the differences among the two. DANAE: day agricultural and non agricultural





*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Table 12: Characteristics of Women with DANAE=1 vs. DANAE=0 at Baseline
Pooled Panel
DANAE=1 DANAE=0 ND P-value DANAE=1 DANAE=0 ND P-value
# of children under 6 years 1.24 1.50 0.23 0.001*** 1.27 1.54 0.26 0.004***
Living in a couple 0.43 0.84 0.93 0.000*** 0.38 0.82 -0.04 0.000***
# of people in the hh 5.05 5.08 0.01 0.876 4.41 4.73 0.19 0.109
Hh head 0.23 0.04 -0.57 0.000*** 0.26 0.04 -0.66 0.000***
Education 2.97 3.26 0.09 0.192 3.06 3.53 0.16 0.118
Age 33.64 32.47 -0.09 0.147 33.37 30.64 -0.22 0.022**
N. Observations 340 6184 126 3234
Note: This table splits the observations of women in S1 (at baseline) among those who had a DANAE and those who
did not have a DANAE, and reports the differences among the two. DANAE: day agricultural and non agricultural





*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Animal origin 24.2 24.1
Industrialized 28.8 28.0
Weekly Transportation Expenditure
To school 0.6 0.7
Other transportation 6.8 5.8
Expenditure on clothes (6 months) 142.8 124.7








N. Households 1720 1141
Note: This table reports data about expenditure and animal ownership for households in the pooled and panel
samples in control localities in Oct 1998 (S3). Amounts are in real pesos of Oct 1998.
C Heterogeneity
In this Appendix I report two sets of results, to see whether the effects of PROGRESA are
different for different subgroups of the sample. For this purpose, I use specification (3).
In the first two tables I use the means index to split the sample in two: the poorest and the less
poor. In the second set of tables I explore whether the effect of PROGRESA is different among
persons who were household heads at baseline and those who were not. See Subsection 5.1.2
for comments about these four tables.
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Table 14: Effect of PROGRESA on the probability of working; Heterogeneity with respect to
the Means Index
MEN WOMEN
Pooled Panel Panel (FE) Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
Less Poor -0.012 -0.001 -0.001 -0.038* -0.029 -0.029
(.011) (.012) (.012) (.021) (.021) (.021)
Poorest -0.019 -0.012 -0.012 0.003 0.000 0.000
( .013) (.017) (.017) (.023) (.020) (.020)
Pre-Program level 0.937 0.942 0.942 0.118 0.104 0.104
N. Obs 18360 12692 12692 19306 13472 13472
Note: This table reports the effect of PROGRESA on the probability of working for the poorest and for the less poor,
separately. I run a regression similar to (3), but in this case I exploit the Means Index to see whether PROGRESA
has a different effect on the poorest and the less poor . Both the poorest and the less poor were classified as “poor”
and therefore are eligible to receive the benefits. Treated individuals are those who live in treated localities. In the
first column I report the results of an OLS regression for a sample that includes all valid observations of men for
which seci,t = 0. In the second column the results of an OLS regression for all valid observations of men who have
seci,t = 0 in all the surveys. In the third column, I use the same sample as before but I include individual fixed
effects. In the fourth-sixth columns I report the results of the same estimations for women. Errors are clustered at
the locality level and reported in parenthesis.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Table 15: Effect of PROGRESA on the probability of having a DANAE; Heterogeneity with
respect to the Means Index
MEN WOMEN
Pooled Panel Panel (FE) Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
Less Poor 0.039 0.039 0.040 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(.024) (.030) (.030) (.009) (.010) (.010)
Poorest 0.041 0.019 0.019 0.004 0.002 0.002
(.031) (.035) (.035) (.009) (.009) (.009)
Pre-Program level 0.714 0.723 0.723 0.045 0.038 0.038
N. Obs 18323 12671 12671 19231 13410 13411
Note: This table replicates Table 14, with day agricultural or nonagricultural employment (DANAE) as dependent
variable. See Table 14 for details.
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Table 16: Effect of PROGRESA on the probability of working; Heterogeneity with respect to
whether the person was household head at baseline (S1)
MEN WOMEN
Pooled Panel Panel (FE) Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
Household Heads -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 -0.047 -0.057 -0.057
(.0081) (.0106) (.0106) (.0561) (.0730) (.0730)
Non Household Heads -0.037 -0.034 -0.035 -0.017 -0.014 -0.014
(.0299) (.0373) (.0373) (.0192) (.0183) (.0183)
Pre-Program level 0.937 0.942 0.942 0.118 0.104 0.104
N. Observations 18360 12692 12692 19306 13472 12692
Note: This table reports the effect of PROGRESA on the probability of working for the those who were household
heads at baseline and those who were not, separately. Treated individuals are those who live in treated localities.
In the first column I report the results of an OLS regression for a sample that includes all valid observations of men
for which seci,t = 0. In the second column the results of an OLS regression for all valid observations of men who
have seci,t = 0 in all the surveys. In the third column, I use the same sample as before but I include individual fixed
effects. In the fourth-sixth columns I report the results of the same estimations for women. Errors are clustered at
the locality level and reported in parenthesis.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Table 17: Effect of PROGRESA on the probability of having a DANAE; Heterogeneity with
respect to whether the person was household head at baseline (S1)
MEN WOMEN
Pooled Panel Panel (FE) Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
Household Heads 0.0437* 0.032 0.032 0.008 -0.009 -0.008
(.0231) (.0262) (.0262) (.0524 ) (.0694) (.0694)
Non Household Heads 0.007 0.017 0.018 0.001 0.000 0.000
(.0415 ) (.0516) (.0515) (.0070) (.0069) (.0069)
Pre-Program level 0.714 0.723 0.723 0.045 0.038 0.038
N. Observations 18823 12671 12671 19231 13410 13410
Note: This table replicates Table 16, with day agricultural or nonagricultural employment (DANAE) as dependent
variable. See Table 16 for details.
D Results with “seci,t = 0” restricted
This Appendix includes the results for a robustness check, where I restrict the definition of
seci,t (see Subsection 4.1 for details). Table 18 shows the effect on work, Table 19 on DANAE
and Tables 20 & 21 the effect on the number of hours worked per week in a DANAE. Results
are qualitatively equal to those obtained in the main text for the original definition of seci,t.
There is, nevertheless, a difficulty with the measurement of the effect of PROGRESA on the
number of hours worked per week in a DANAE (see Subsection 5.2 for the empirical strategy).
Table 20 shows the impact of PROGRESA on DANAE for those who had a DANAE in S1 (as
Table 5 does for the original definition of seci,t = 0 in the main text). The effect of PROGRESA
on the probability to have a DANAE in S3 for those who had a DANAE in S1 is small and non
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significant. Nevertheless, the effect is significantly negative in S5, that is, PROGRESA had a
negative effect (of 3.2-3.7 percentage points) on the probability of having a DANAE in S5 for
those who had a DANAE in S1. This implies that the sample used to estimate the effect of
PROGRESA on the number of hours worked in S5 (second set of lines of Table 21) is selected:
the probability to belong to the sample is higher for people from control localities than from
treated localities, and therefore the estimates for S5 may be biased.
Table 18: Impact of PROGRESA on the Probability of Working [seci,t = 0 restricted]
MEN WOMEN
Pooled Panel Panel (FE) Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
Baseline
βT -0.014 -0.007 -0.007 -0.022 -0.018 -0.018
(.010) (.012) (.012) (.019) (.015) (.015)
Dynamic Effects
βT 3 (in t = 3) -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 -0.027 -0.023 -0.023
(.012) (.014) (.014) (.022) (.018) (.018)
βT 4 (in t = 4) -0.020 -0.014 -0.014 -0.026 -0.024 -0.024
(.012) (.014) (.014) (.019) (.017) (.017)
βT 5 (in t = 5) -0.013 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010 -0.007 -0.007
(.010) (.013) (.013) (.023) (.019) (.019)
Heterogeneous Effects
βT (for GAi=0) -0.020 -0.013 -0.014 -0.025 -0.021 -0.021
(.016) (.017) (.017) (.020) (.018) (.018)
βT + βTG (for GAi=1) -0.012 0.000 0.001 -0.021 -0.015 -0.015
(.010) (.011) (.011) (.023) (.020) (.020)
Pre-Program Level 0.936 0.940 0.940 0.116 0.102 0.102
N. Obs 16545 11336 11336 17337 12024 12024
Note: This table reports the effect of PROGRESA on the probability of working. Treated individuals are those who
live in treated localities. I modify the definition of seci,t = 0, I change the first point of the definition so that it reads:
“there have been no children of ages between 11 to 17 since Oct 1997 (t = 1) and up to t”. In the first column I
report the results of an OLS regression for a sample that includes all valid observations of men for which seci,t = 0.
In the second column the results of an OLS regression for all valid observations of men who have seci,t = 0 in all
the surveys. In the third one, I use the same sample as before but I include individual fixed effects. In the fourth-
sixth columns I report the results of the same estimations for women. Errors are clustered at the locality level and
reported in parenthesis. See the main text for the definition of GAi .
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 19: Impact of PROGRESA on the probability of having a DANAE [seci,t = 0 restricted]
MEN WOMEN
Pooled Panel Panel (FE) Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
Baseline
βT 0.035 0.016 0.016 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004
(.0230) (.027) (.027) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Dynamic Effects
βT 3 (in t = 3) 0.052* 0.020 0.021 -0.004 -0.007 -0.008
(.029) (.032) (.032) (.008) (.009) (.009)
βT 4 (in t = 4) 0.027 0.016 0.017 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004
(.025) (.029) (.029) (.009) (.010) (.010)
βT 5 (in t = 5) 0.020 0.011 0.012 0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(.028) (.033) (.033) (.009) (.009) (.009)
Heterogeneous Effects
βT (for GAi=0) 0.044 0.028 0.029 0.004 0.004 0.004
(.028) (.032) (.032) (.010) (.010) (.010)
βT + βTG (for GAi=1) 0.027 0.001 0.001 -0.007 -0.014 -0.014
(.026) (.033) (.033) (.009) (.010) (.010)
Pre-Program Level 0.674 0.466 0.466 0.059 0.049 0.049
N. Obs 16510 11317 11317 17219 11973 11973
Note: This table replicates Table 18, with day agricultural or nonagricultural employment (DANAE) as dependent
variable. See Table 18 for details.
Table 20: Effect of PROGRESA on DANAE for those with a DANAE at baseline [seci,t = 0
restricted]
Pooled Panel Panel(FE)
Baseline -0.014 -0.025 -0.025
βT (.015) (.015) (.015)
Dynamic effects
βT 3 (in t = 3) 0.002 -0.018 -0.017
(.022) (.024) (.023)
βT 5 (in t = 5) -0.037** -0.033* -0.032*
(.018) (.019) (.019)
N. Obs 9256 6091 6091
Note: This table reports the effect of PROGRESA on the probability of having a day agricultural or a nonagri-
cultural employment (DANAE) in S3/S5 for those who had a DANAE in S1 (no data about the number of hours
worked is reported in S4). Treated individuals are those who live in treated localities. I modify the definition of
seci,t = 0, I change the first point of the definition so that it reads: “there have been no children of ages between 11
to 17 since Oct 1997 (t = 1) and up to t”. In the first column I report the results of an OLS regression for a sample
that includes all valid observations of men for which seci,t = 0 and who had a DANAE in S1. In the second column
the results of an OLS regression for all valid observations of men who have seci,t = 0 in all the surveys and who had
a DANAE in S1. In the third column, I use the same sample as before but I include individual fixed effects. Errors
are clustered at the locality level and reported in parenthesis.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 21: Effect of PROGRESA on the number of hours worked [seci,t = 0 restricted]
Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
βT 3 (in t = 3) 0.262 0.604 0.613
(.964) (1.132) (1.130)
Pre-Program Level 43.48 43.25 43.25
N. Obs 5037 3066 3066
βT 5 (in t = 5) -0.607 -0.482 -0.470
(1.001) (1.100) (1.098)
Pre-Program Level 43.78 43.61 43.61
N. Obs 4465 3404 3404
Note: This table reports the effect of PROGRESA on the number of hours worked per week for men who had a day
agricultural or nonagricultural employment (DANAE) in S1 and who also had it in S3/S5, respectively. Treated
individuals are those who live in treated localities. I modify the definition of seci,t = 0, I change the first point of
the definition so that it reads: “there have been no children of ages between 11 to 17 since Oct 1997 (t = 1) and up
to t”. In the first column I report the results of an OLS regression for a sample that includes all valid observations
of men for which seci,t = 0 and who had a DANAE in S1 and also have it in S3/S5, respectively. In the second
column the results of an OLS regression for all valid observations of men who have seci,t = 0 in all the surveys and
who had a DANAE in S1 and who also have it in S3/S5 respectively. In the third column, I use the same sample as
before but I include individual fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the locality level and reported in parenthesis.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
E Results for the Entire Sample
This Appendix replicates Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the main text for the whole sample of PRO-
GRESA. That is, for all adult agents regardless of their value of seci,t (see Section 4 for the
definition of seci,t). Results of Tables 22 and 23 are similar to what was previously found by
Skoufias et al. (2001) and Skoufias and di Maro (2008). They are, all in all, coherent with
no negative effect on the extensive margin. If something, PROGRESA had a positive effect
on DANAE for men, however this effect seems to be important at the beginning (S3) and to
decrease afterwards (S4 and S5).
There is, nevertheless, a difficulty with the measurement of the effect of PROGRESA on the
number of hours worked per week in a DANAE (see Subsection 5.2 for the empirical strategy).
Table 24 shows the impact of PROGRESA on DANAE for those who had a DANAE in S1
(as Table 5 does for people with seci,t = 0 in the main text). The effect of PROGRESA on
the probability to have a DANAE in S3 for those who had a DANAE in S1 is small and non
significant. Nevertheless, the effect is significantly negative (at 10% level) in S5 for the pooled
sample. PROGRESA had a negative effect of 3 percentage points on the probability of having a
DANAE in S5 for people in the pooled sample who had a DANAE in S1. This implies that the
pooled sample used to estimate the effect of PROGRESA on the number of hours worked in S5
(second set of lines of Table 25) is selected: the probability to belong to the sample is higher
for people from control localities than from treated localities, and therefore the estimates for
S5 may be biased.
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Table 22: Impact of PROGRESA on the Probability of Working [full sample]
MEN WOMEN
Pooled Panel Panel (FE) Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
Baseline
βT -0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014
(.007) (.007) (.007 ) (.015) (.014) (.014)
Dynamic Effects
βT 3 (in t = 3) 0.003 0.008 0.008 -0.014 -0.017 -0.017
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.016) (.016) (.016)
βT 4 (in t = 4) -0.011 -0.005 -0.004 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011
(.008) (.009) (.009) (.015) (.015) (.015)
βT 5 (in t = 5) -0.001 0.006 0.006 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.018) (.017) (.017)
Pre-program Level 0.927 0.936 0.936 0.143 0.130 0.130
N. Obs 51158 39784 39784 52871 41652 41652
Note: This table reports the effect of PROGRESA on the probability of working. Treated individuals are those who
live in treated localities. In the first column I report the results of an OLS regression for a sample that includes all
valid observations of men (not only those with seci,t = 0) . In the second column the results of an OLS regression
for all valid observations of men who can be observed throughout the four surveys. In the third column, I use the
same sample as before but I include individual fixed effects. In the fourth-sixth columns I report the results of the
same estimations for women. Errors are clustered at the locality level and reported in parenthesis.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Table 23: Impact of PROGRESA on the probability of having a DANAE [full sample]
MEN WOMEN
Pooled Panel Panel (FE) Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
Baseline
βT 0.045** 0.037 0.038 0.005 0.005 0.005
(.021) (.023) (.023) (.006) (.005) (.005)
Dynamic Effects
βT 3 (in t = 3) 0.066** 0.056** 0.056** 0.008 0.006 0.006
(.027) (.028) (.028) (.007) (.006) (.006)
βT 4 (in t = 4) 0.037 0.030 0.031 0.003 0.004 0.004
(.024) (.025) (.025) (.007) (.006) (.006)
βT 5 (in t = 5) 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.005 0.005 0.005
(.026) (.028) (.028) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Pre-program Level 0.674 0.466 0.466 0.059 0.049 0.049
N. Obs 51015 39688 39688 52676 41491 41491
Note: This table replicates Table 22, with day agricultural or nonagricultural employment (DANAE) as dependent
variable. See Table 22 for details.
Table 24 shows the impact of PROGRESA on DANAE for those who had a DANAE in S1. The
effect of PROGRESA on the probability to have a DANAE in S3 for those who had a DANAE
in S1 is small and non significant. But, the effect is significantly negative in S5 for the pooled
sample. PROGRESA had a negative effect of 3 percentage points on the probability of having
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a DANAE in S5 for those who had a DANAE in S1, this effect is significant at 10% level. This
implies that the sample used to estimate the effect of PROGRESA on the number of hours
worked in S5 (second set of lines of Table 25) could be slightly selected: the probability to
belong to the sample is higher for people from control localities than from trated localities,
and therefore the estimates for S5 may be biased.
Table 24: Effect of PROGRESA on DANAE for those with a DANAE at Baseline [full sample]
Pooled Panel Panel(FE)
Baseline -0.008 -0.013 -0.013
βT (.015) (.015) (.015)
Dynamic effects
βT 3 (in t = 3) 0.011 -0.002 -0.002
(.023) (.022) (.022)
βT 5 (in t = 5) -0.030* -0.024 -0.024
(.016) (.017) (.017)
N. Obs 26394 20220 20220
Note: This table reports the effect of PROGRESA on the probability of having a day agricultural or a nonagri-
cultural employment (DANAE) in S3/S5 for those who had a DANAE in S1 (no data about the number of hours
worked is reported in S4). Treated individuals are those who live in treated localities. In the first column I re-
port the results of an OLS regression for a sample that includes all valid observations of men (not only those with
seci,t = 0) who had a DANAE in S1. In the second column the results of an OLS regression for all valid observations
of men who can be observed throughout the four surveys and who had a DANAE in S1. In the third column, I
use the same sample as before but I include individual fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the locality level and
reported in parenthesis.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Table 25: Effect of PROGRESA on the Number of Hours Worked per Week [full sample]
Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
βT 3 (in t = 3) 0.149 0.521 0.520
(.808) (.852) (.851)
Pre-Program Level 43.60 43.37 43.37
N. Obs 12670 9750 9750
βT 5 (in t = 5) 0.405 0.418 0.428
(.770) ( .779) (.779)
Pre-Program Level 43.86 43.65 43.65
N. Obs 12492 10736 10736
Note: This table reports the effect of PROGRESA on the number of hours worked per week for men who had a day
agricultural or nonagricultural employment (DANAE) in S1 and who also had it in S3/S5, respectively. Treated
individuals are those who live in treated localities. In the first column I report the results of an OLS regression for
a sample that includes all valid observations of men (not only those with seci,t = 0) who had a DANAE in S1 and
also have it in S3/S5, respectively. In the second column the results of an OLS regression for all valid observations
of men who can be observed throughout the four surveys, had a DANAE in S1 and who also have it in S3/S5
respectively. In the third column, I use the same sample as before but I include individual fixed effects. Errors are
clustered at the locality level and reported in parenthesis.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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F Threats to Identification and Falsification Tests
In this Appendix I try to rule out some threats to identification (see Section 6 for details).
Table 26: Prices of Consumption Goods
Obs. Villages Control Treat t-stat P-value
Kg tomatoe 757 413 6.7 6.9 1.11 0.269
Kg onion 751 406 5.1 5.6 1.56 0.120
Kg potatoe 668 382 6.0 6.6 2.45 0.015**
Kg carrot 229 191 4.0 4.2 0.62 0.538
Kg orange 383 276 3.2 3.0 -0.82 0.415
Kg banana 542 350 3.6 3.7 0.93 0.352
Kg apple 322 250 9.3 9.8 1.52 0.130
Kg tortillas 239 198 3.6 3.6 -0.42 0.678
Kg rice 1065 473 6.5 6.5 0.03 0.975
Kg meat of chicken 376 278 18.6 19.4 1.37 0.171
Kg meat of cow 208 185 26.8 26.3 -0.36 0.719
Kg beans 938 459 9.6 9.7 0.38 0.703
Kg eggs 968 463 9.1 9.1 0.05 0.960
L of milk 682 398 5.9 6.0 0.45 0.653
Kg sugar 1092 479 5.6 5.6 0.39 0.698
Note: Errors are clustered at the locality level. All prices are expressed in Oct 1998 (S3) real pesos. Information is
taken from the ENCEL surveys: Cuestionario de la localidad.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Table 27: Ownership Status of the House
Pooled Panel
Own house (fully paid) 90.71 90.69
Own house (paying) 0.28 0.38
Rented 0.5 0.41
Lent 8.23 8.35
Received in exchange of something 0.16 0.09
Others 0.09 0.06
Does not know/No answer 0.03 0.02
Total 12773 6541
Note: Data taken from S1 for observations with “seci,t = 0”.
Table 28: Wages Reported at the Locality Level
Obs. Localities Control Treat t-statistic
Legal minimum daily agricultural w. 1497 505 30.8 30.6 -0.17
Real daily agricultural w (men) 1449 504 29.4 29.2 -0.17
Real daily agricultural w (women) 619 349 26.5 26.9 0.29
Note: w: wage. Errors are clustered at the locality level. Data on wages is available for S3, S4 and S5. All prices are
expressed in Oct 1998 (S3) pesos. This information is taken from the ENCEL surveys: Cuestionario de la localidad.
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Table 29: Effect of PROGRESA on Wages per Hour
Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
S3 0.206 0.234 0.261*
(.131) (.154) (.154)
Pre-Program Level 4.39 4.07 4.07
N. Obs 4927 3010 3010
S5 0.180 0.224 0.216
(.142) (.148) (.149)
Pre-Program Level 4.31 4.11 4.11
N. Obs 4363 3348 3348
Note: This table reports the effect of PROGRESA on the wage per hour for men who had a DANAE in S1 and also
have it in S3/S5, respectively. I restrict the analysis for men within the 99% of hourly wage range, that is, for all
who had a real hourly wage smaller than 26 pesos per hour. All figures are in real pesos of Oct. 1998. To compute
the wages I divide the earnings per week by the total number of hours worked per week.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Table 30: Effect of PROGRESA on Non-Eligibles
MEN WOMEN
Baseline Pooled Panel Panel (FE) Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
Work 0.000 0.009 0.009 -0.030* -0.001 -0.002
(.009) (.012) (.012) (.017) (.026) (.026)
Pre-Program Level 0.939 0.948 0.948 0.249 0.269 0.269
N. Obs 17804 7436 7436 16841 6996 6996
DANAE 0.018 0.008 0.008 -0.009 -0.001 0.003
(.023) (.032) (.032) (.010) (.017) (.010)
Pre-Program Level 0.575 0.520 0.520 0.103 0.099 0.099
N. Obs 17754 7418 7418 16762 6969 6969
Note: This table reports the effect of PROGRESA on the probability of working and on the probability of having a
day agricultural or a nonagricultural employment (DANAE). I restrict the analysis to people who were classified as
non poor, and therefore who were not eligible to receive the cash transfers of PROGRESA. Treated individuals are
those who live in treated localities. In the first column I report the results of an OLS regression for a sample that
includes all valid observations of men for which seci,t = 0. In the second column the results of an OLS regression
for all valid observations of men who have seci,t = 0 in all the surveys. In the third column, I use the same sample as
before but I include individual fixed effects. In the fourth-sixth columns I report the results of the same estimations
for women. Errors are clustered at the locality level and reported in parenthesis.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 31: Effect of PROGRESA on the Poorest Half of Non-Eligibles
MEN WOMEN
Baseline Pooled Panel Panel (FE) Pooled Panel Panel (FE)
Work 0.002 0.005 0.007 -0.034 -0.023 -0.023
(.012) (.018) (.018) (.020) (.035) (.035)
Pre-Program Level 0.937 0.944 0.944 0.230 0.258 0.258
N. Obs 8773 3116 3116 8407 2940 2940
DANAE 0.019 0.022 0.025 -0.017 0.002 0.002
(.027) (.041) (.040) (.014) (.029) (.029)
Pre-Program Level 0.625 0.580 0.580 0.097 0.090 0.090
N. Obs 8753 3112 3112 8369 2932 2932
Note: This table replicates Table 30, but here I restrict the analysis to the poorest half (using the means index)
of people who were classified as non poor, and therefore who were not eligible to receive the cash transfers of
PROGRESA. See Table 30 for details.
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